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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY
Other Crimes Evidence to Show Knowledge, Intent, System, etc.
As usual, a number of decisions decided during the past term
involve the admissibility of other crimes to show knowledge, intent,
system, etc.' Two of these, State v. Prieur and State v. Moore,3 are
perhaps the most significant cases decided by the Louisiana supreme
court in the criminal evidence field in some time, indicating an in-
creased concern for the protection of the individual from what the
new majority finds to be unfair police and prosecutorial practices.4
Both decisions reflect a turning away from a recent line of cases which
had taken what the writers believe to have been an unduly expansive
view of the admissibility of other crimes evidence,5 and a return to
an earlier, more orthodox position. The problem is perceptively ana-
lyzed in depth in an excellent comment in a previous issue of this
Review6 and the subject will therefore not be treated in detail here; a
brief discussion will suffice for present purposes.
In State v. Prieur,7 authored by Justice Barham, the court, by a
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Law student, Louisiana State University.
1. See State v. Crockett, 262 La. 197, 263 So. 2d 6 (1972); State v. Clouatre, 262
La. 651, 264 So. 2d 595 (1972); State v. Hayes, 262 La. 674, 264 So. 2d 603 (1972); State
v. Dunn, 263 La. 58, 267 So. 2d 193 (1972); State v. Dudek, 263 La. 258, 268 So. 2d
217 (1972); State v. Williams, 263 La. 755, 269 So. 2d 232 (1972); State v. Woodfox,
263 La. 935, 269 So. 2d 820 (1972); State v. Campbell, 263 La. 1058, 270 So. 2d 506
(1973); State v. McLeod, 271 So. 2d 45 (La. 1973); State v. Shaw, 271 So. 2d 860 (La.
1973); State v. Washington, 272 So. 2d 355 (La. 1973); State v. St. Amand, 274 So. 2d
179 (La. 1973); State v. Edgecombe, 275 So. 2d 740 (La. 1973); State v. Jordan, 276
So. 2d 277 (La. 1973); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973); State v. Moore, 278
So. 2d 781 (La. 1973); State v. Richmond, 278 So. 2d 17 (La. 1973); State v. Foy, 278
So. 2d 38 (La. 1973); State v. Frezal, 278 So. 2d 64 (La. 1973).
2. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
3. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
4. In the opinion of the writers, it is difficult to rationalize State v. Prieur, 277
So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), with State v. St. Amand, 274 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973), a case
authored by Justice Summers and handed down the same day as Prieur. Further, the
writers have difficulty with the rationale suggested by Justices Tate and Calogero in
their concurring opinions in State v. Frezal, 278 So. 2d 64 (La. 1973) (a most unusual
case), for distinguishing it from Prieur and Moore.
5. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971
Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REv. 344, 349 (1972).
6. Comment, 33 LA. L. REv. 614 (1973).
7. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
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four to three majority, held that it was reversible error for the trial
court, in a prosecution for armed robbery of a bus driver, to introduce
evidence of a service station robbery eight days later. It found that
evidence of such crimes did not fit within either the knowledge or
intent exception to the "other crimes" exclusionary rule provided for
in R.S. 15:445 and 446. In this regard the court quoted with approval
Professor McCormick's definitions of "knowledge" and "intent,"'
giving these terms a much narrower interpretation than recent Louis-
iana decisions afforded them, and stated that "whoever held up the
bus driver, Morris Johnson, knew what he was doing and intended
what he was doing; there was no question of the robber's acts being
'inadvertent, accidental, unintentional or without guilty knowl-
edge.' "I The court added in a significant footnote that the only possi-
ble way in which the proffered evidence would be admissible to show
knowledge or intent would be in the "utterly unlikely event" that the
defendant himself injected such issue, in which case the evidence
might "conceivably" be admissible in the state's case in rebuttal.
The court further found that the evidence was not admissible to show
system,'" the third exception enumerated in R.S. 15:445 and 446,
"[nior was it properly admissible under any other exception to the
'other crime' exclusionary rule."" In addition to the exceptions enu-
merated in R.S. 15:445 and 446, the court recognized that Louisiana
law authorizes admissibility of evidence of related crimes forming
part of the res gestae, 2 and of a witness' conviction of a crime offered
8. C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed. 1972).
9. 277 So. 2d 126, 129 (La. 1973).
10. "We explained in State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So. 2d 793 (1971), that
crimes of system are those acts and offenses which are of a like nature and exhibit like
methods or plans of operation. Spencer was a prosecution for armed robbery, and we
held that evidence as to another armed robbery was admissible, for there the other
armed robbery followed the same modus operandi as the armed robbery charged and
was related in time and location." 277 So. 2d 126, 128 (La. 1973).
11. 277 So. 2d at 129.
12. See LA. R.S. 15:447 (1950) and LA. R.S. 15:448 (1950).
An interesting post-Prieur case as to crimes constituting part of the res gestae is
State v. Foy, 278 So. 2d 38 (La. 1973), a murder prosecution. The supreme court found
no error in the district attorney's making reference in his opening statement, to defen-
dant's escape from a "work detail" immediately prior to the alleged murder, holding
same to have been "part of the res gestae." In the opinion of the writers, the Foy case
is sound. It is believed that "res gestae" as used in the other crimes context should be
interpreted to refer to those crimes which are so wrapped up with the crime charged
that whoever committed that crime charged was fully aware of such other crimes as
well, and nothing in State v. Foy suggests a different approach. (See also in this
connection State v. Richmond, 278 So. 2d 17 (La. 1973), decided during the past term,
which is in accord with the approach taken in Foy.) The so-called res gestae exception
[Vol. 34
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for purposes of impeachment.' 3 The court did not make clear, how-
ever, whether it might recognize other exceptions to the other crimes
exclusionary rule. Because of the inadmissibility of the service station
robbery, the court found it necessary to reverse the conviction.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Prieur opinion is what
the court said concerning the admissibility, on the possible retrial of
the instant case, of evidence of another alleged bus robbery also ad-
mitted by the trial court. Because of the closeness in time (eighteen
days previously), and the fact that in both instances the armed rob-
beries were of a bus driver and occurred at the same corner at the
same time of night, the court said that evidence of the other crime
might well be admissible at the new trial to show that both crimes
were part of a "system" within the meaning of R.S. 15:446. The court
indicated, however, that to be admissible as evidence of such a sys-
tem, the state would have to adduce "clear and convincing evi-
dence"' 4 that defendant committed the other crime.
The court found that the spirit of the Louisiana Constitution
relative to the rights of the citizen accused of crime requires the
establishment of safeguards prerequisite to the admissibility of other
crimes evidence under R.S. 15:445 and 446. In keeping with this
conclusion, the court, citing two Minnesota cases'" which had estab-
lished similar safeguards in that state, outlined five safeguards which
it said would be applicable on the retrial of the instant case and to
all cases tried after the instant decision became final. Because of their
importance, these safeguards are set forth in the margin.'6 Phrased
to the hearsay rule has at times been given a very broad interpretation indeed, and it
is believed that the cases decided in that context are not necessarily controlling where
the question is whether certain other crimes form part of the res gestae.
13. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 180 § 1.
14. 277 So. 2d 126, 129 (La. 1973). See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary
ed. 1972).
15. State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967) and State v. Spreigl,
272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
16. "(1) The State shall within a reasonable time before trial furnish in writing
to the defendant a statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing same
with the general particularity required of an indictment or information. No such notice
is required as to evidence of offenses which are a part of the res gestae, or convictions
used to impeach defendant's testimony.
"(2) In the written statement the State shall specify the exception to the general
exclusionary rule upon which it relies for the admissibility of the evidence of other acts
or offenses.
"(3) Prerequisite to the admissibility of the evidence is a showing by the State that
the evidence of other crimes is not merely repetitive and cumulative, is not a subter-
fuge for depicting the defendant's bad character or his propensity for bad behavior,
and that it serves the actual purpose for which it is offered.
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in broad general terms, they necessarily leave a number of unan-
swered questions to be elucidated in the future on a case-by-case
basis. Continued uncertainty in the law there must be, but the court
by setting forth these guidelines is attempting to state in advance
generally what it will require of the prosecution in this sensitive area
and thereby to reduce reversals as to the admissibility of other crimes
evidence.
The other landmark decision as to the admissibility of other
crimes evidence was the four to three decision in State v. Moore7
authored by Justice Dixon, handed down about three months after
State v. Prieur and signed by the same four justices who comprised
the majority in Prieur. State v. Moore, a rape prosecution, concerned
the admissibility of evidence tending to indicate that the defendant
had raped another girl four or five blocks away four days before.
There were, however, dissimilar circumstances, and the majority
found that the other alleged rape did not fit into any exception pro-
vided by R.S. 15:445 and 446. Following a scholarly analysis of Eng-
lish law in the area, the court in a very important passage stated:
However, in spite of the prejudicial nature of evidence of
other offenses, criminal cases cannot be tried in an antiseptic
vacuum. Matters which are logically relevant to issues before the
jury should not be excluded merely because they show the ac-
cused has committed other offenses. Nevertheless, even if rele-
vant, because the evidence of other offenses is so strongly prejudi-
cial 'the greatest care ought to be taken to reject such evidence,
unless it is plainly necessary to prove something which is really
in issue.' R. v. Bond (1906) 2 K.B. 389, 417.'1
Finding that the claimed prior rape was not relevant to the alleged
instant rape, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the
admission of evidence with respect to it would be unduly prejudicial.
A very significant aspect of the Moore decision is its emphasis
that the state cannot always rely upon a defendant's "not guilty" plea
as justification for the admissibility of other crimes evidence to show
"(4) When the evidence is admitted before the jury, the court, if requested by
defense counsel, shall charge the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence
is received and is to be considered.
"(5) Moreover, the final charge to the jury shall contain a charge of the limited
purpose for which the evidence was received, and the court shall at this time advise
the jury that the defendant cannot be convicted for any charge other than the one
named in the indictment or one responsive thereto." 277 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. 1973).
17. 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
18. Id. at 787. (Footnote omitted.)
[Vol. 34
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knowledge and intent. 9 Whether or not such may be done in a partic-
ulat case, suggests the court, depends upon the reality of the circum-
stances.20
Character of the Accused-Cross-examination of Character Witness
Where a defendant has placed his character at issue by calling a
character witness, it is generally held that, to test the character wit-
ness' knowledge of defendant's reputation and standard of evalua-
tion, the prosecution, on cross-examination of the character witness,
may properly ask whether he has ever heard of prior arrests or acts
of misconduct of the defendant. To prevent the cross-examination
from wafting "unwarranted innuendo,"2 the better view is that the
defendant is entitled to certain safeguards against improper use of
such questions. 3 In light of the relevancy of this line of questioning,
and the fact that in this context character may not be properly proved
or disproved by specific instances, the writers believe that the charac-
ter witness should not be permitted to give positive or affirmative
testimony as to the fact of the particular arrests or acts inquired
about-only whether he had heard of same. 4 Without discussing this
distinction, the court in State v. Daniels,25 an attempted rape case,
relying on prior Louisiana cases, upheld the trial court's overruling
of defendant's objection to the prosecution's questioning as to
whether a character witness called by the defendant was "aware" of
19. "In explaining whether the evidence of other crimes might be relevant, the
'matter in issue' must be real and genuine, and not one which the prosecution con-
ceives to be at issue merely because of the plea of not guilty. Archbold, 34th Ed.,
§ 1016. 'The mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts everything material in issue is
not enough for this purpose. The prosecution cannot credit the accused with fancy
defences in order to rebut them at the outset with some damning piece of evidence.'
R. v. Thompson (1918) A.C. 221, 232." 278 So. 2d 781, 785 (La. 1973).
20. A similar approach is to be seen in State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973),
and also in State v. Jordan, 276 So. 2d 277 (La. 1973), another important case decided
during the past term. State v. Bell, 279 So. 2d 164 (La. 1973) indicates the importance
the court places upon the prejudicial effect of reference to evidence of other crimes,
and demonstrates that the prosecution should proceed with care in mentioning other
crimes in its opening statement, or inquiring into same for purposes of impeachment
of a non-defendant witness.
21. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948);,McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE
§ 191 (Cleary ed. 1972).
22. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 (1948).
23. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); Miller v. State, 418 P.
2d 220 (Okla. 1966); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 191 (Cleary ed. 1972).
24. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); but see McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 191 (Cleary ed. 1972).
25. 262 La. 475, 263 So. 2d 859 (1972).
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prior arrests of the defendant for attempted rape and driving while
intoxicated. Such a question, it is believed, violated the distinction
noted above. The distinction, it is submitted, is important and
should be recognized in Louisiana. Further, it is hoped that safe-
guards similar to those adopted in other jurisdictions and by the
Louisiana supreme court in State v. Prieur"6 relative to the admissi-
bility of other crimes evidence 7 to show knowledge, intent, system,
etc. will also be adopted in Louisiana in this area.
Lie Detector Test
In a scholarly opinion authored by Justice Tate in State v.
Refuge, 21 the court followed the general American position that, ab-
sent stipulation, the results of lie detector tests are inadmissible, as
is testimony as to whether or not a witness was willing to take such a
test.2" The court held, however, that although "extremely close,"
under the facts of the instant case the error was not so prejudicial as
to necessitate reversal.
COMPETENCY
In a well-reasoned opinion by Justice Dixon in State v. Glover,5
a unanimous court held that, under the circumstances of the case, the
trial court committed reversible error in finding a 12-year-old child
incompetent to testify. The court noted that no Louisiana case had
been discovered holding a 12-year-old child incompetent, and found
that there was insufficient evidence in the record in the instant case
to support the trial judge's conclusion that the witness was not a
person of proper understanding, the test laid down by R.S. 15:469.
EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
Cross-examination and the Right of Confrontation
State v. Soukup3' affords a fascinating illustration of the possible
interaction between defendant's right of confrontation and a state's
26. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
27. See discussion under "Other Crimes Evidence to Show Knowledge, Intent,
System, etc.," supra.
28. 264 La. 135, 270 So. 2d 842 (La. 1972).
29. As to the propriety of such a question, see State v. Stahl, 236 La. 362, 107 So.
2d 670 (1958), noted in 19 LA. L. REv. 881 (1959); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1958-1959 Term-Evidence, 20 LA. L. REv. 335, 344 (1960).
30. 262 La. 495, 263 So. 2d 866 (1972).
31. 275 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973).
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witness' privilege against self-incrimination. A crucial state's wit-
ness, who himself was under suspicion in a possession of marijuana
case, was permitted by the trial court to assert the fifth amendment
as to some matters (those deemed by the court not to be self-
incriminatory), but ordered to testify as to others. Defendant's inabil-
ity effectively to cross-examine the state's witness under the circum-
stances necessitated reversal, concluded a divided court, because of
what it found to be a denial of defendant's right of confrontation. The
court in effect held that the state could not avail itself of the testi-
mony of a witness where, because of the witness' assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination, defendant could not effectively
cross-examine him. Today's answer to such a quandary on the part
of the prosecution would presumably be for the state either not to call
the witness, or under the authority of Louisiana's recently adopted
compelled testimony statute2 to require him to testify fully and thus
to deny itself future use of such testimony.
Court's Witness
In State v. Mims" the trial court refused defendant's request to
call a witness as its own in order that both defendant and the prosecu-
tion could cross-examine him. In a per curiam decision, the supreme
court upheld the action of the trial court, stating:
The contention of defendant on this point is without merit, inas-
much as there is no procedural rule in Louisiana requiring the
Court to call a witness so that both sides may cross-examine
him .34
Although there is no statutory authority in Louisiana requiring such
action by the trial court, it would seem that under certain circum-
stances it would be quite appropriate for the trial court to comply
with such a request 5 and that in some instances the failure of the trial
court to grant such a request should be held reversible error. That
undue restrictions on a defendant's questioning of a witness called by
him, coupled with inability to bring to the jury's attention helpful,
trustworthy out-of-court statements by such witness, under certain
circumstances may constitute a denial of due process of law, is the
32. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1; see Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of
Inves., 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
33. 263 La. 193, 267 So. 2d 570 (1972).
34. Id. at 195, 267 So. 2d at 571 (1972).
35. Young v. United States, 107 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1939); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 8 (Cleary ed. 1972).
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subject of a very important recent holding by the United States Su-
preme Court.3
6
Refreshing Recollection-Right of Cross-examiner to Inspect
Memorandum
R.S. 15:279 is in accord with the general American view that a
witness' use of a document to refresh his memory is not dependant
on its having been made by him contemporaneously with the event
described therein. In State v. Holloway,37 three members of the court,
in persuasive scholarly opinions (one concurring and two dissent-
ing),38 took the position that Louisiana should also follow the safe-
guards generally followed elsewhere as to the use of such memoranda:
(1) that to avoid abuse same is subject to the control of the court,
including the authority of the trial court in its discretion to forbid the
use of the memorandum if it finds that its value as an aid to memory
is outweighed by "the danger of undue suggestion, '39 and (2) that the
opposing side has the right to inspect the memorandum which the
witness seeks to use and to have same available in cross-examining
the witness. The majority per curiam decision apparently deemed it
unnecessary to pass upon these points. 0
Other cases decided during the past term dealing with the right
to inspect a witness' prior memorandum are discussed along with the
materials dealing with criminal discovery.4'
ATTACKING CREDIBILITY
Prior Inconsistent Statements
Use of Uncautioned Statements for Impeachment Purposes
In a per curiam decision in State v. Williams," the court found
that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial
36. Chambers v. Mississippi, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973).
37. 274 So. 2d 699 (La. 1973).
38. Justice Calogero concurring, and Justices Barham and Tate dissenting.
39. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 9 (Cleary ed. 1972).
40. See in this connection Justice Calogero's concurring opinion. The case of State
v. Tharp, 284 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973), decided during the 1973-74 term clearly indicates
an acceptance of the above noted safeguards urged by Professor McCormick, and
states: "Insofar as State v. Holloway, 274 So. 2d 699 (1973), State v. Nails, 255 La.
1070, 234 So. 2d 184 (1970) and State v. Franklin, 263 La. 334, 268 So. 2d 249 (1972)
are in conflict with this opinion they are overruled."
41. See also the discussion in "Right to Inspect a Witness' Prior Memorandum"
under "Discovery, Production, and Inspection of Evidence in Criminal Cases," infra.
42. 271 So. 2d 857 (La. 1973).
(Vol. 34
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court's finding that a challenged statement taken by the authorities
from the defendant had been preceded by the caution prescribed by
Miranda v. Arizona," and that the statement had been voluntarily
given. Over protest by Justice Barham, the court, without discussion,
went on to state that in view of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Harris v. New York" defendant's statement would be
admissible for impeachment purposes, even absent the Miranda
warnings. Justice Barham in his concurring opinion properly points
out that Harris v. New York merely permits a state to use such a
statement for impeachment purposes, and of course does not compel
it to do so. The Harris decision is a controversial one, and for the
court to adopt it without discussion, in unnecessary language in a per
curiam decision, seems unfortunate.
Collateral Matter
Extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to impeach a witness by show-
ing that, outside of court, he had made an inconsistent statement
about some collateral matter. 5 A different rule would result in time-
consuming inquiry into side issues. That such inquiry might be not
only time-consuming, but extremely prejudicial, is demonstrated by
State v. Kaufman" where, on rehearing, in a five to two decision, the
court reversed a murder conviction on the ground that the state had
attempted to impeach its own witness as to a prior inconsistent state-
ment relative to a collateral, and extemely prejudicial, racial mat-
ter."
Past Convictions
In keeping with the broad authorization of R.S. 15:495, the su-
preme court in State v. Rossi 8 held that a witness may be impeached
by convictions which are quite remote in time (in the Rossi case
presumably more than twenty-five years), and regardless of the fact
that the earlier crime has no particularized relevance to truth or
43. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
45. See LA. R.S. 15:494 (1950).
46. 278 So. 2d 86 (La. 1973).
47. See also State v. St. Amand, 274 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973), an armed robbery case,
where in light of the particular circumstances presented, a divided court held admissi-
ble an out-of-court statement by the defendant admitting drug use, as contradictory
to testimony given by him on the stand. The writers agree with Justice Tate's dissent-
ing opinion that the testimony was as to a collateral matter and thus under R.S. 15:494
is inadmissible to impeach.
48. 273 So. 2d 265 (La. 1973).
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veracity. Similarly, said State v. Odom,4" a witness may be im-
peached by a misdemeanor conviction as well as a felony. In the
opinion of the writers R.S. 15:495 is unduly broad.50 Reflecting con-
cern about unfettered use of prior convictions to impeach, Justice
Barham, in a concurring opinion in State v. Odom, stated:
In the proper case we should exclude the introduction of
other convictions for the purpose of impeachment and as an at-
tack upon credibility unless the convictions are of offenses which,
by their very nature, charge perjury, falsification, or lack of truth-
fulness.'
Conditional Discharge
Under the authority of R.S. 40:983 a trial judge may defer sent-
ence and place a first offender convicted of certain drug offenses on
probation, on condition that if he complies with the terms of his
probation, he will be discharged and his conviction expunged. State
v. Rabbas52 makes it clear that a witness who has been placed on
probation under the authority of this provision and has not violated
the terms of his probation may not properly be impeached by such
"convictions."
Right to Counsel
State v. Kelly 3 held that it was not necessary for the state in its
cross-examination of a defendant relative to a prior conviction for
purposes of impeachment to lay a predicate showing that he was
represented by counsel at the earlier trial. The court took the position
that Loper v. Beto54 was inapplicable.
The record in the Kelly case reveals that, although defendant
objected to questioning as to prior convictions and took a bill of
exceptions relative to same, defense counsel made no claim in the
trial court that in the prior proceedings culminating in conviction,
defendant had been denied his constitutional right to counsel. Argu-
ment to this end was made for the first time on appeal. Likewise at
the trial of Loper (which took place before Gideon v. Wainwright),5
49. 273 So. 2d 261 (La. 1973). See also State v. Green, 273 So. 2d 288 (La. 1973)
(like effect).
50. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (Cleary ed. 1972).
51. 273 So. 2d 261, 265 (La. 1973).
52. 278 So. 2d 45 (La. 1973). Consider also the effect of the provisions of LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 894.
53. 271 So. 2d 870 (La. 1973).
54. 405 U.S. 473 (1972). See also Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
55. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[Vol. 34
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defense counsel had failed to argue that the convictions inquired into
for the purpose of impeachment had been obtained in consequences
of proceedings at which defendant had been denied his right to coun-
sel. A critically important distinction, however, between Loper v.
Beto and State v. Kelly is that Loper was a habeas corpus proceeding
rather than an appeal."
It would seem clear from Loper v. Beto that absent effective
waiver, the prosecution may not properly ask a defendant about a
prior conviction where such conviction was obtained in consequence
of a proceeding in which defendant was denied his constitutional
right to counsel. Further, as seen in Loper, contemporaneous objec-
tion to such a line of impeachment is not a prerequisite for considera-
tion on habeas corpus. Loper v. Beto does not however go so far as to
require the prosecution affirmatively to show that a prior conviction
inquired into for purpose of impeachment was constitutionally ob-
tained as a prerequisite to questioning defendant relative to same.
But if such conviction was in fact obtained unconstitutionally, defen-
dant may, under Loper, thereafter be able to secure a new trial via a
habeas corpus proceeding, unless he somehow has waived his right. 7
The prosecutor should therefore proceed with great care in attempt-
ing impeachment via the showing of prior convictions, for he may
thereafter be called upon to litigate the prior conviction's constitu-
tionality in a collateral proceeding attacking the instant conviction.
Further, it is believed that if defendant and his counsel are fully to
protect themselves against the possibility of waiver, and are aware at
the trial of the unconstitutionality of the prior conviction, they should
raise the invalidity of the prior conviction at the trial level and there-
after pursue the matter on appeal, rather than rely upon some subse-
quent collateral attack.
Cross-examination as to Prior Criminal Acts, Absent Conviction
Two decisions involving Raymond Prieur were decided during
the past term and both are very important. The first has already been
discussed.5s The second State v. Prieur9 firmly establishes that a
defendant witness may not, on cross-examination, be asked about
56. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443 (1965); Faye v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); State v. Barrabina, - So. 2d
__ (La. 1973) (especially Justice Tate's concurring opinion); Comment, 26 LA. L.
REv. 705 (1966).
57. Id.
58. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973), is discussed under "Relevancy,"
supra.
59. 277 So. 2d 134 (La. 1973).
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past crimes for which there has been no conviction, where the relev-
ance of such crime is for impeachment purposes only. State v.
Perkins"0 had earlier strongly indicated this to be the Louisiana rule,
but was not altogether clear, and it is very helpful to have the matter
further clarified. The problems involved are extensively explored in
an excellent comment published earlier in this Review.6 1
Impeaching Own Witness
Louisiana R.S. 15:487 provides:
No one can impeach his own witness, unless he have been
taken by surprise by the testimony of such witness, or unless the
witness show hostility toward him, and, even then, the impeach-
ment must be limited to evidence of prior contradictory state-
ments.62
Since such a prior inconsistent statement is admissible merely to
neutralize the testimony given by the witness on the stand, and not
to prove its substantive content, 3 it seems quite illogical to permit a
party thus to impeach his own witness if he knows in advance that
the witness will testify adversely to his cause. 4 To do so makes it
possible for a party to call a witness in order to "get in" an out-of-
court statement with the hope that the jury might give it the forbid-
den effect. Despite the logic of this position, the court in 1936 in State
v. Williams" applied R.S. 15:487 literally, holding that a party could
impeach his own witness if the witness were hostile, even though the
party was not "surprised" by the witness' testimony.
In State v. Rossi,6 Justice Tate, in a concurring opinion to a
decision authored by himself, reconsidered the problem and emphati-
cally indicated that when and if the question is squarely presented,
the Williams decision, and sporadic cases following it, should be reex-
60. 248 La. 293, 178 So. 2d 255 (1965).
61. Comment, 33 LA. L. REV. 630 (1973).
62. For a case decided during the past term illustrating the principle that the state
cannot properly impeach its own witness except under certain circumstances, see
Justice Tate's decision on rehearing in State v. Kaufman, 278 So. 2d 86 (La. 1973)
(especially footnote 2, page 96, and accompanying text).
63. See State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV.
306, 311 (1973).
64. See Justice Tate's persuasive dissenting opinion in State v. Finley, 275 So. 2d
762 (La. 1973). See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1960-1961
Term-Evidence, 22 LA. L. REv. 397 (1962).
65. 185 La. 849, 171 So. 52 (1936).
66. 273 So. 2d 265 (La. 1973).
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amined by the court. The implication is clear that Justice Tate, at
least, believes that the Williams rule should be reversed. Further, he
suggested that the standard for showing that a party's witness is
"hostile" "should be much more carefully examined and strictly lim-
ited to situations where some intrinsic bias in favor of the defendant
and antagonistic to the state's case must first be shown, such as a
devoted wife called as a witness against her husband. The state's
simple declaration that the witness is 'hostile' since unwilling to tes-
tify as the state wishes should not suffice."67
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
Attorney- Client
In a well-documented opinion in Eagle Industrial Associates, Inc.
v. Universal Oil Corporation"8 authored by Judge Bolin, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal, relying in part on State v. Childersy held
that where an attorney-client communication is made for the purpose
of committing a fraud, the privilege itself is vitiated, and the attorney
may be obliged to testify. The decision appears eminently sound.
HEARSAY
Assertive Acts as Hearsay
Under the traditional view, assertive non-verbal conduct, not
under oath or subject to cross-examination at the time performed,
offered in court to prove the truth of such assertion, is just as much
hearsay as a verbal assertion of like character. 0 Thus it is submitted
that the court was in error in State v. St. Amand7" when it stated that
out-of-court action, assertive in character, by someone other than the
witness, identifying the defendant, was non-hearsay, because it was
"physical activity performed in [the witness'] presence and viewed
by him,"72
Complaint to Police
In State v. McLeod73 the court, via a per curiam opinion, upheld
67. Id. at 271.
68. 277 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
69. 196 La. 554, 199 So. 640 (1940).
70. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 250 (Cleary ed. 1972); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
62(1); Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954).
71. 274 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973).
72. Id. at 190.
73. 271 So. 2d 45 (La. 1973).
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the admission of testimony of an out-of-court complaint to the arrest-
ing officer by a non-witness as to crimes other than the one for which
the defendant was being charged. The court made a broad, blanket
statement that:
it is well settled that an officer can testify that a complaint was
made, and what action he took as a result of that complaint.
State v. Favre, 255 La. 690, 232 So. 2d 479 (1970).1 4
Under certain circumstances the complaint to the arresting officer
may have independent relevance apart from the truthfulness of its
content and thus be admissible as non-hearsay," or fit some recog-
nized exception to the hearsay rule. It is submitted, however, that the
content of a complaint received by a police officer is not necessarily
admissible over a hearsay objection." Admissibility here, as else-
where, should, it is submitted, depend upon the relevance of the
complaint and the use to which the evidence is to be put. In the
instant case the complaint, it is believed, should have been held
inadmissible, for it was an out-of-court charge as to very serious other
crimes, and the fact of the charge apart from its truth seems to have
had very little relevance. Perhaps the fact of the other crimes could
have been properly proved, but not by an unsworn statement by a
non-witness. Any probative value as to the content of the complaint
was out-weighed, it is believed, by its prejudicial impact."
Family History-Newspaper Article
State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health"8 was a
mandamus action brought by the mother of a child to compel the
defendant to issue a birth certificate for the child showing her to be
of the "white" race. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the
trial court erred in excluding a 1970 newspaper account discussing the
history of the child's maternal family and its purported descent from
74. Id. at 48. See also in this connection State v. Preece, 264 La. 156, 270 So. 2d
850 (1972). For a subsequent history of the Favre case in federal court, see Favre v.
Henderson, 464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); United States
ex rel. Favre v. Henderson, 444 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1971); Favre v. Henderson, 318 F.
Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1970).
75. See Comment, 14 LA. L. REV. 611 (1954).
76. See State v. Favre, discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REv. 381, 386 (1971). See also Favre v.
Henderson, 464 F. 2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); United States
ex rel. Favre v. Henderson, 444 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1971); Favre v. Henderson, 318 F.
Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1970).
77. See State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973).
78. 275 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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a freed African slave. The court said, however, that although admissi-
ble, the newspaper article was entitled to "little weight," and ulti-
mately decided in favor of petitioner on the merits.
Although the writers generally favor the current trend toward
relaxation of the hearsay rule, especially in Louisiana civil cases tried
before a judge alone, it is believed that this newspaper article, recent
in origin, discussing remote geneological traditions should not have
been held admissible to prove the facts contained therein. This news-
paper account is to be clearly distinguished from that admitted in
Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., " a well-known deci-
sion authored by Judge Wisdom. The Dallas County case concerned
a very reliable old contemporary account in a local newspaper of a
fact that was at the time published the subject of firsthand knowl-
edge of many of the readers. 0 Although proof of family history is an
appropriate subject of a well-recognized hearsay exception, the ambit
of the exception, it is believed, should not be extended to include
recent newspaper accounts. The writer of the newspaper story, if
available, might perhaps have been properly permitted to testify over
hearsay objection but the propriety of admitting the newspaper arti-
cle seems very questionable.
DISCOVERY, PRODUCTION, AND INSPECTION OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES
Louisiana, it is submitted, is in desperate need of a meaningful
discovery system for criminal cases.8" The supreme court took a sig-
nificant and forward-looking step in that direction in State v.
Migliore,"2 holding that under appropriate circumstances a defendant
accused of illegal possession of marijuana is entitled to have his ex-
pert in advance of trial examine the substance alleged to be such.
79. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
80. Succession of Marcour, 180 La. 129, 156 So. 198 (1934), was cited in Plaia as
authority for the admissibility of the newspaper account. Marcour, however, concerned
the admissibility of an old contemporary death notice published in the newspaper
which, inter alia, stated the age of the decedent at the time of his death, which was
received in evidence by the trial court as evidence of his age at death. It is submitted,
therefore, that Marcour is not necessarily controlling as to the question presented in
Plaia. The circumstances relative to the newspaper article in the Marcour case were
much more like those of the Dallas County case than the facts in the instant case.
81. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REv. 306, 321 (1973).
82. 261 La. 722, 260 So. 2d 682 (1972). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REv. 306, 321 (1973); The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Criminal Procedure 1, 33
LA. L. REv. 295, 298 (1973).
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This significant decision was seemingly limited 3 to its facts" by State
v. Jones.5 However, the action of the court in its brief per curiam
decision in the more recent case of State v. Flood,"8 when taken to-
gether with the concurring and dissenting opinions therein, suggests
that the court may now be more inclined than indicated by State v.
Jones to take a broader view relative to defendant's inspection in
advance of trial of physical evidence in the hands of the procescu-
tion.5 7
Right to Inspect a Witness's Prior Memorandum
Where a police officer has testified for the state, is defense coun-
sel entitled to inspect prior reports, notes, or records made by the
witness, in order to use same in cross-examining the witness, and
possibly as impeachment evidence if it develops that the prior records
contain statements contradictory to those given by the witness on the
stand?" In State v. Franklin"5 the court, adhering to prior jurisprud-
ence, continued to reject the position taken by the United States
Supreme Court in the Jencks"' case, holding that no such right exists
absent a showing that the out-of-court statement is contradictory to
that given by the witness on the stand." In the opinion of the writers,
the position taken in the Franklin case does not afford the defendant
sufficient protection.2 Unless defense counsel is permitted to inspect
83. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Barham in State v. Jones, 263 La. 164,
182, 267 So. 2d 559, 566 (1972).
84. Id. at 176, 267 So. 2d at 564: "possession of a substance which is criminal
merely by virtue of its chemical composition."
85. 263 La. 164, 267 So. 2d 559 (1972).
86. 273 So. 2d 294 (La. 1973).
87. For more intensive discussion of last term's decisions dealing with the broader
problem of discovery and the duty of the prosecution to disclose, see Criminal
Procedure, page 423 supra.
88. The right of opposing counsel to inspect a statement used by a witness on the
stand to refresh his memory is discussed under "Examination and Cross-
Examination-Refreshing Recollection," supra.
89. 263 La. 344, 268 So. 2d 249 (1972).
90. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See also Note, 18 LA. L. REv.
345 (1958); Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 350 (1958).
91. To similar effect, see State v. Curry, 262 La. 616, 264 So. 2d 583 (1972),
concerning a prior written statement given to police by a person other than a police
officer (who thereafter is called to the stand by the prosecution), and State v. Cryer,
262 La. 575, 263 So. 2d 895 (1972), concerning prior written reports made by a United
States special narcotics agent testifying for the state. See also State v. Brumfield, 263
La. 147, 267 So. 2d 553 (1972), concerning refusal to permit defendant to see police
reports purportedly used by police officers to refresh memory prior to taking the stand.
92. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957
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the witness' prior statement, it may be impossible for him to show
the inconsistency, the prerequisite to seeing the out-of-court stat-
ment. 3
Confessions and Inculpatory Statements-Advance Written Notice
and Non-reference in Opening Statement
The state's opening statement is a device, albeit inadequate,
traditionally performing part of the task of giving the defendant no-
tice as to what the state expects to prove.94 Recognizing, however, the
prejudicial effect to a defendant of the state's adverting in its opening
statement to a confession or inculpatory statement which thereafter
is found to be inadmissible, the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure
prohibited mention of a confession or inculpatory statement in the
opening statement,"5 and required instead that the defendant be
given advance written notice of same.96 In State v. Clouatre97 the
Term-Evidence, 18 LA. L. REv. 139, 143 (1957).
93. In State v. Tharp, 284 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973), decided during the 1973-74 term,
a police officer testifying for the state, asked on cross-examination by the defendant
how he was able to be so precise as to certain critical data testified to, replied, "That's
what I have in my report, and I write my report up when I pick up evidence," and
thereafter stated that he had'a copy of his report with him on the stand. A divided
court held that defense counsel was entitled to see the report. The majority found that
the facts did not present a situation where a police officer "was testifying from memory
refreshed outside the courtroom prior to taking the stand." The court stated: "We hold
that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to examine the report. Defen-
dant had the right to establish the nature of the testimony given from a prior record
to determine the accuracy and truthfulness of that testimony, or of the record itself.
The trial court is obligated to monitor and control the testimony from a prior record.
That court must determine if memory is actually refreshed as required by R.S. 15:279,
which is the overwhelming view of the common law jurisdictions which we should
follow in criminal prosecutions absent contrary statutory provisions. Here no such
determination was made. The court disallowed the second safeguard when it refused
to permit defendant to examine the report or memorandum, and to cross-examine the
witness for the purpose of determining the credibility of the testimony or the record.
"Insofar as State v. Holloway, 274 So. 2d 699 (1973), State v. Nails, 255 La. 1070,
234 So. 2d 184 (1970) and State v. Franklin, 263 La. 334, 268 So. 2d 249 (1972) are in
conflict with this opinion they are overruled."
See also the discussion under "Refreshing Recollection-Right of Cross-examiner
to Inspect Memorandum," supra.
94. For discussion of the use of the opening statement, see official comments to
Code of Criminal Procedure article 769.
95. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 767.
96. Id. art. 768.
97. 262 La. 651, 264 So. 2d 595 (1972). See also three other cases decided during
the past term: State v. Richmond, 278 So. 2d 17 (La. 1973); State v. Curry, 263 La.
997, 270 So. 2d 484 (1972); State v. Johnson, 263 La. 462, 268 So. 2d 620 (1972).
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court held that the advance written notice requirement does not
apply to statements forming part of the res gestae. Further, in State
v. Johnson,"5 following the court's earlier decision in the Fink9 case,
the court held that the advance written notice is not required for
statements allegedly made by the defendant prior to the criminal act
charged.10°
As an extension of the above approach State v. Curry'0 held that
despite the prohibition in article 767 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure against the state's "in any way" adverting in its opening state-
ment to a confession or inculpatory statement made by the defen-
dant, the state could properly so advert to a statement by the defen-
dant to a companion when they were allegedly covering up the mur-
der victim that, "I don't have to kill you. You're in this with me."'' 2
Finding the statement to be part of the res gestae, the court con-
cluded that the prohibition of article 767 did not apply.0 3 Further, in
Curry, for the same reason, the court held that the prosecution had
not erred when it replied in the negative to defendant's pre-trial
motion for a bill of particulars and motion to suppress relative to the
state's possible possession of an inculpatory statement made by the
defendant.
In the opinion of the writers, whether or not an incriminating
statement made by the defendant is part of the res gestae, it nonethe-
less should be deemed an inculpatory statement within the meaning
of articles 767 and 768. Whether such statement forms part of the res
gestae, or was made before or after the alleged crime, it is submitted
that a defendant should at least be entitled to the advance notice
98. 263 La. 462, 268 So. 2d 620 (1972). See State v. Curry, 263 La. 997, 270 So. 2d
484 (1972) (to like effect).
99. State v. Fink, 255 La. 385, 231 So. 2d 360 (1970). See The Work of the Louis-
iana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Criminal Procedure, 31 LA. L. REv.
370, 374 (1971).
100. For another case decided during the past term taking a somewhat relaxed
attitude towards the requirement of article 768 as to advance written notice to a
defendant of the state's intention to use a confession or inculpatory statement, see
State v. Coates, 273 So. 2d 282 (La. 1973). Relying in part on State v. Lacoste, 256
La. 697, 237 So. 2d 871 (1970), and the harmless error provision of Code of Criminal
Procedure article 921, the court found no reversible error in the trial court's denying a
defendant's request for a continuance where the defendant had been provided with a
copy of the written confession, but had not been given the required written notice of
intent to utilize same, and defendant failed to make any showing that he was either
surprised or prejudiced by the state's technical non-compliance with the provisions of
article 768.
101. 263 La. 997, 270 So. 2d 484 (1972).
102. Id. at 1003, 270 So. 2d at 486.
103. To similar effect, see State v. Crockett, 262 La. 197, 263 So. 2d 6 (1972).
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provided for by article 768 and the prohibition in article 767 against
the same's being mentioned in the state's opening statement.
Exculpatory Statements
In State v. Jones,"°4 also decided during the past term, the court
held that despite the provisions of article 767 the district attorney
may properly advert in his opening statement to a post-crime "excul-
patory statement" later to be offered by the state. The statement in
question must have contained inculpatory implications or otherwise
presumably it would not have been offered by the state. Its relevancy
when offered by the prosecution apparently resulted from its inculpa-
tory impact, and it is believed that the protection afforded by articles
767 and 768 should apply to such statement.
Advance Written Notice in Non-jury Trial
Further limiting the salutary safeguards of article 768, the court
in State v. Cleary,105 relying on State v. Himel,1°6 held that no ad-
vance written notice is required when the case is to be tried by the
judge alone without a jury. Justice Summers authored a very persu-
asive and eloquent dissenting opinion concluding:
State v. Himel, 260 La. 949, 257 So. 2d 670 (1972), upon
which this decision rests was rendered by a divided court and
should be reconsidered. The decision has the effect, in nonjury
trials, of doing away with both the opening statement and the
early advice in writing that a confession or inculpatory statement
will be used. The effect is to permit the State to surprise the
defendant in a nonjury trial but not in a jury trial. 07
104. 263 La. 164, 267 So. 2d 559 (1972).
105. 262 La. 539, 263 So. 2d 882 (1972).
106. 260 La. 949, 257 So. 2d 670 (1972). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REv. 306, 319 (1973); The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Criminal Procedure H, 33
LA. L. REv. 300, 303 (1973).
107. 262 La. 539, 543, 263 So. 2d 882, 883-84 (1972).
